Ben-Porath meets Lazear : microfoundations for dynamic skill formation by Cavounidis, Costas & Lang, Kevin
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/113229                                                    
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Ben-Porath meets Lazear: Microfoundations for
Dynamic Skill Formation∗
Costas Cavounidis† and Kevin Lang‡
January 23, 2019
Abstract
We provide microfoundations for dynamic skill formation with a model of invest-
ment in multiple skills, when jobs place different weights on skills. We show that credit
constraints may affect investment even when workers do not exhaust their credit. Firms
may invest in their workers’ skills even when there are many similar competitors. Firm
and worker incentives can lead to overinvestment. Optimal skill accumulation resem-
bles, but is not, learning by doing. An example shows that shocks to skill productivity
benefiting new workers but lowering one skill’s value may adversely affect even rela-
tively young workers, and adjustment may be discontinuous in age.
1 Introduction
We develop a tractable two-period model of dynamic skill formation with investment in
multiple skills and heterogeneous jobs. Our model draws heavily on the insights of Lazear
(2009) in viewing jobs as putting linear weights on skills. We place this in the context of
lifetime investment in the spirit of Ben-Porath (1967).
Our approach makes several contributions. First, it offers a more realistic treatment
of the varieties of human capital and the jobs that use them. We depart from treating
manual/routine/abstract work as a hierarchy, and thus can account for occupations such as
veterinarian and kindergarten teacher that combine manual with abstract tasks. Second,
∗This research was funded in part by NSF grant SES-1260917. We are grateful to Arun Advani, Dan
Bernhardt, Mirko Draca, Ed Lazear, Paul Oyer, Pascual Restrepo and participants in CRETE and the
economic theory workshop at Boston University for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.
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the model explains the differential career paths of workers by skills and age. In particular,
we address the patterns of displacement caused by technological shocks. Third, the model
provides new insights into the financing of human capital acquisition and the distortions its
imperfections may create, to which we now turn.
The model provides a novel explanation for why firms help workers invest in general
skills and why workers frequently invest in skills that they do not intend to use much,1 with
markedly different implications from those of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a&b). We do this
by introducing wage bargaining and mobility frictions, so that workers have an incentive
to invest for their best outside option in order to raise their wage at their current job. If
firms can offer contracts that guarantee financing of some human capital investment, even
if workers’ own investments cannot be contracted, this inefficiency can be blunted. This
happens in a somewhat peculiar way. Optimal contracts commit the firm to overinvest in
skills useful at the current job, relative to the first best, in order to temper workers’ incentive
to overinvest in other skills.
Our model can also explain why, even when credit constraints appear to be unimportant,
some workers do not undertake what appear to be highly profitable investments. In their
excellent review of credit constraints in education, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012) dis-
cuss how when investment is constrained by borrowing limits, individuals receive a marginal
return on investment that exceeds the gross interest rate and borrow up to their credit limit.
This result is correct when earnings are a concave function of (homogeneous) human capital
or, more precisely, when there is a decreasing marginal return to spending, broadly defined,
on schooling. However, in our model the complementarity between occupation choice and
skill choice can create a natural local convexity in the returns to spending on training in some
skill. Then, when a borrowing limit prohibits undertaking the unconstrained investment, the
worker may prefer a much smaller investment such that she borrows strictly less than her
borrowing limit. The worker will appear unconstrained - the borrowing constraint will not
bind with equality - but the constraint will nevertheless affect the outcome.
But are such constraints common? As an example, we note that apprenticeships in
painting are typically two or three years. Plumbing apprenticeships are generally four or
five years and typically require coursework. For instance, in Montana, there is no license for
1We provide two anecdotes. While working in a very demanding job as Director of Player Development for
the San Diego Padres, Theo Epstein, currently President of Basbeall Operations for the Chicago Cubs, earned
a law degree. While contract law and labor law were arguably relevant to his job, the full degree included
courses in criminal and constitutional law, skills unlikely to be useful in player development or baseball
management, more generally. Marie (a real person, known to one of us), while working in a demanding
advertising job, pursued a BA through the adult education section of a local university even though she was
unlikely ever to work in a job for which it was important for her to have a degree.
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painters.2 In contrast, to become a journeyman plumber in Montana, a worker can complete
the Associate of Applied Science degree in Plumbing Technology at Montana State Univer-
sity - Northern, for which tuition and fees over the two years are approximately $23,000.
After degree completion, apprenticeships last three years.3 Under plausible assumptions, the
internal rate of return on this investment relative to becoming a painter is in excess of 11
percent.4 Without question, there are many reasons that a worker might choose to become
a painter rather than a plumber, but at least one plausible explanation is that potential
plumbers face credit constraints.
How is this consistent with the consensus that credit constraints were relatively unimpor-
tant for determining schooling levels in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s
(Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2012), and possibly even for the 1960s (Lang and Ruud 1986)?
Perhaps credit constraints were unimportant then. But the earnings gap between plumbers
and painters was, if anything, higher in that period (Mellor 1985). Our model suggests that
the discrepancy between the high returns to investing in plumbing skills and the apparent
absence of credit constraints is due to the fact that job choice can lead to non-concave re-
turns to investment, and that standard methods treat those for whom constraints do not
bind with equality as unconstrained.5
We show conditions under which investment is discontinuous in the age of the worker,
but the full import of this finding is better understood in terms of workers’ responses to
unanticipated changes in skill prices. Therefore, we investigate a continuous-time version of
the model, albeit in a world with no mobility costs or credit constraints. We provide a simple
example with two skills in which workers with less than roughly four years of experience move
swiftly to acquire the skill that has become more valuable while more experienced workers,
who are already heavily invested in the skill that has become less valuable, do not.
We then use the continuous-time model to explore the effects of asymmetric shocks to the
production technology on the careers and earnings of workers of different ages. Two effects
2https://paintingleads.com/painting-contractor-license-requirements/ accessed 11/18/2017.
3Information accessed on the Montana State University - Northern website 11/17/2017.
4According to payscale.com (accessed 11/18/2017), the average painter makes $36,000 per year, compared
with the average apprentice plumber who makes $30,000. But the apprentice plumber is on her way to being a
journeyman plumber for whom average annual earnings are $52,000, and potentially even more as a master
plumber. These numbers are consistent with Bureau of Labor Statistics averages. If we assume that the
painter apprentices earn $30,000 per year for two years and then earn the average of $36,000 every year for
43 years and if we further assume that the plumber pays tuition over two years and earns nothing, then earns
the average apprentice salary of $30,000 for three years before earning the average of $52,000 for journeymen
plumbers for 40 years, the internal rate of return is just over 11 percent. We view these assumptions as
optimistic for painters and pessimistic for plumbers.
5Bernhardt and Backus’s (1990) model also predicts that credit-constrained workers will choose different
jobs - those with a flatter wage profile. Their result is based on consumption-smoothing rather than human
capital investment.
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lead older workers to adjust less to shocks than young ones:
1. Horizon: The time over which to exploit new skills is declining in age. This makes new
skills less valuable to older workers.
2. Inertia: Mature workers are more skilled and, possibly, more specialized than fresh
ones. Therefore, acquiring new skills leads to a smaller shift in jobs. This makes skill
adjustment less effective.
These two effects combine so that workers respond to shocks to the value of skills in
predictable ways. Autor and Dorn (2009) show that as employment in routine cognitive
jobs declined, the proportion of older workers in these jobs also grew. This reflects some
combination of reduced inflows and increased outflows of younger workers. The data used
in that paper do not allow them to estimate the relative importance of these two effects.
In Appendix B, we provide some small supplementary evidence using panel data that the
desktop computer revolution caused younger workers, but not older workers, to exit routine-
cognitive intensive jobs.
Of course, it is unsurprising that older workers are less likely to leave adversely shocked
jobs or to move to positively shocked jobs. This will happen in any model in which mobility
is a costly investment and thus has a horizon effect. But tautologically a single skill model
cannot explain movement to a job that is intensive in a different skill. We expect, and our
model implies, that how the worker invests in response to a negative shock depends on her
previously accumulated skills (inertia).6 Single-skill models might predict that when scanner
technology reduces the value of skill in cashiering, workers may move away from such jobs.
Our model helps explain who remains a cashier, who trains to be an electrician and who
trains to be a store manager.
We show by way of an example that since investment is front-loaded, the inertia effect can
‘kick in’ early. In fact, due to this front-loading, shocks beneficial to the youngest workers
can be strongly adverse to workers only slightly older. This is potentially important for
both positive and normative reasons. On the one hand, it helps explain the disaffection and
opposition to free trade among relatively young workers whom we might expect to be able to
adapt to and benefit from technology shocks that make otherwise similar new entrants better
off. On the other, this finding suggests that if it wishes to address the adverse effects of trade
6We also observe this inertia effect outside of the mainstream labor market. Sviatschi (2018) shows early
experience in the illegal cocoa industry increases later activity in the illegal drug trade by more than predicted
by reduced school attendance. A single-skill model does not predict this. Rather children build on their
parents’ early investment in their knowledge of the industry as our model predicts. Similarly Arora (2018)
finds, consistent with a model of heterogeneous skills, that decreasing punishment for crimes committed at
a relatively young age increases criminality at older ages at which punishment is not reduced.
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or technology shocks, government must act swiftly to subsidize retraining, even before there
is large-scale displacement.
We are certainly not the first to address the dynamics of human capital investment. The
work of Heckman and coauthors (e.g. Cunha and Heckman 2008) focuses on the dynamics
of investment in cognitive and noncognitive skills, particularly prior to labor market entry.
Prada and Urzua (2017) find that also accounting for mechanical ability greatly affects how
we should think about investment in education. Bowlus, Mori and Robinson (2016) explore
how skill use evolves over the life-cycle. Sanders and Taber’s (2012) two-period model is
closest to ours but follows Lazear in assuming that the worker will randomly meet only one
firm. Altonji (2010) emphasizes the growing need for a research agenda that recognizes that
skill is multidimensional rather than hierarchical, and that jobs differ in their requirements.
2 The Two-Period Model7
We will now turn to the tractable, two-period model for which we prove the results outlined
in the introduction. For a more general model, and a discussion of which results hold in that
broader setting, we refer the interested reader to this paper’s online appendix.
There exist N different skills. The worker begins period 1 endowed with a vector of
skill levels S ∈ RN+ . We treat premarket investment as exogenous. We do, however, assume
that the worker can arrive in the labor market with something other than the skills that
are optimal for her. This may be due to uncertainty; the value of skills in the future may
be unknown, and the worker or those investing in her may wish to diversify against this
uncertainty. Schooling may be insufficiently individualized or premarket skill investment
may reflect goals other than maximizing market earnings.
A job is a vector J ∈ RN+ of weights applied to the worker’s skills. At job J , a worker
with skills S produces
ΣnAnJnSn (1)
where A >> 0. The worker chooses a job J ∈ RN+ which must satisfy
ΣnJ
σ
n ≤ 1 (2)
where σ > 1. A is the productive efficiency of different skills, representing how the current
technology uses each skill. An has the useful interpretation that it is the maximum weight
on skill n in any job: a job that only uses skill n puts weight of An on it. This allows us to
7Throughout this paper we use vector inequality notation as follows: x >> y ⇔ ∀n xn > yn; x > y ⇔
∀n xn ≥ yn and x 6= y; x ≥ y ⇔ ∀n xn ≥ yn.
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discuss technology in terms of changes in A while holding the set of jobs constant.
Differences in A can capture differences in the value of a skill over time. Knowing how
to shoe horses is a skill that has declined in value even though the job persists. We can also
capture differences across workers in their capacity to use (or equivalently, later in the paper,
learn) that skill. An individual who is ‘good at math’ has a higher Amath and will turn the
same amount of math education into a higher level of production in math-intensive jobs.
Workers will choose their job to maximize production (or wages) given S. Optimal job
choice implies a job J such that ΣnJ
σ
n = 1. With only two skills, when σ = 2, the northeast
boundary of the set of available jobs is the unit quarter circle in the positive quadrant; there,
a boundary job using both skills equally puts a weight of An
√
.5 on each. As σ → 1, the
trade-off between the skills - given by the northeast boundary - tends to a straight line.
The limit is thus the (excluded) case where workers always choose to use only one skill. As
σ → ∞, the job set becomes a square, and it is thus disadvantageous to move away from
using both skills equally.
The worker chooses J to maximize the Lagrangian
ΣnAnJnSn − λ (ΣnJσn − 1) . (3)
Maximization gives the first-order conditions
AnSn = λσJ
σ−1
n (4)
along with the constraint. Solving, we have
Jn =
(AnSn)
1
σ−1(∑
n [AnSn]
σ
σ−1
) 1
σ
. (5)
Note that dJn/dSn ≥ 0; the higher a worker’s skill, the more weight the job she chooses puts
on it. Workers naturally choose jobs they’re good at.
Finally, using (5), we get the value of the skill endowment
V (S) = max
J∈RN+ :ΣJσn≤1
∑
n
AnJnSn =
(∑
n
[AnSn]
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ
. (6)
Note that this resembles a CES production function except that the exterior exponent is
less than 1 rather than greater than or equal to 1. This is significant because it means that
the function is convex rather than concave - as a skill increases, production would increase
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linearly if the job remained constant; however, the worker re-optimizes and increases the
weight on that skill.
We now augment the model with a second productive period, and allow the worker to
invest in skills following production in period 1, increasing them by I at cost
C(I) = ΣnI
ρ
n (7)
with ρ > 1. Note that since skill typically has no natural scale, we can normalize the
coefficients on In rather than writing ψnI
ρ
n. Of course, this normalization will affect Sn and
An, but this simplifies the problem.
Following the investment choice the worker again chooses a job, so that the worker’s
lifetime problem is to maximize the Lagrangian
ΣnAnJ1,nSn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 1 Production
+ β ΣnAnJ2,n (δSn + In)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Period 2 Production
− ΣnIρn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment Cost
−λ (ΣnJσ1,n − 1)− µ (ΣnJσ2,n − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Job Choice Constraints
,
(8)
where J1 and J2 are the jobs in periods 1 and 2, β is the discount factor and δ is the rate at
which skills do not depreciate (1 minus the depreciation rate) between periods 1 and 2.
It should be apparent that the problem is separable. First-period job choice and invest-
ment do not depend on each other. Separating investment and second-period job choice and
using the formula for V from (6) to simplify it, we get the maximand
max
I∈RN+
[
β
(
Σ[An(δSn + In)]
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ − ΣIρn
]
, (9)
which yields the first-order conditions for I:
β
A
σ
σ−1
n (δSn + In)
1
σ−1(
Σm[Am(δSm + Im)]
σ
σ−1
) 1
σ
− ρIρ−1n = 0 (10)
and arrive at (
An
Am
)σ
δSn + In
δSm + Im
=
(
In
Im
)(ρ−1)(σ−1)
. (11)
The solution is guaranteed to be unique when (σ − 1)(ρ− 1) > 1 and S 6= 0. The existence
of a corner solution with In = 0 requires Sn = 0 and that (ρ− 1)(σ − 1) ≤ 1.8
8To see this, notice that when Sn = 0, the left hand side of (11) goes to 0 more slowly than the right
hand side as In ↓ 0 when (ρ− 1)(σ − 1) > 1. That the marginal cost of investment is 0 at 0 drives the fact
that workers invest in all skills they are endowed with - without such an assumption, some of our results
would have to be qualified in ways that are not easily stated in terms of primitives.
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Note that the standard presentation of the Ben-Porath model assumes that investment
takes the form of foregone production while we treat investment as a cost. This distinction
is largely a matter of convenience. Someone who is capable of earning $x and chooses to
invest $y foregoes a proportion y/x of her income. Since tautologically, in the Ben-Porath
model, post-schooling workers never devote their entire potential income to human capital
investment, with a single skill, our model resembles a Ben-Porath model of post-schooling
investment.
2.1 Implications
Although it makes intuitive sense, no existing model is designed to explain why older workers
who have invested more heavily in a skill respond less to a shock to the value of skills. We will
address this point more directly in the continuous-time model. Here we lay the groundwork
by showing both inertia in investment and the effect of a shorter horizon on investment.
Proposition 1 Investment in skill n is increasing in the endowment of skill n. That is,
if S ′n > Sn and for m 6= n we have S ′m = Sm, and there is an m 6= n s.t. Sm 6= 0, then
I∗′n > I
∗
n. Furthermore, the period-2 weight on skill n is increasing in the endowment of skill
n; J∗′2,n > J
∗
2,n.
Proof. See appendix for all proofs.
Thus skill builds on itself. A worker who has a high level of skill chooses a job that
makes greater use of that skill. Knowing that she will be in a similar job next period, the
worker chooses to invest more in the type of skill that she currently uses. An alignment
of incentives causes workers with a higher stock of a skill to both (i) choose initial jobs
where they use more of that skill and (ii) invest more in that skill. In a manner somewhat
analogous to Lazear (2009), workers invest in skills that make them particularly good at
the type of job they currently occupy even though there is no learning by doing.9 A similar
alignment of incentives operates in Jovanovic (1979), where a worker with a higher level of
firm-specific human capital invests more in firm-specific human capital as finding a better
match is unlikely, making the worker more likely to continue to use it.
With heterogeneous skill depreciation rates, Proposition 1 is easily extendable to also
imply that workers invest less in skills that depreciate more rapidly. Note that this occurs
9Note that the proposition does not say that workers always specialize (see the working paper for con-
ditions under which workers will tend to specialize and when they instead converge towards the same job).
What the proposition says is that if two otherwise identical workers enter the market but one has more of
skill n than the other, that worker will invest more in skill n even if both will invest more heavily in some
other skill. More generally, in an infinite period model, the first worker will invest more in n in every period
even if in infinite time they would end up at the same job.
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even though the investment itself does not depreciate. Instead, because their initial skill
depreciates, workers will optimally choose a job that makes less use of it; as a consequence,
they invest less in the skill. In addition, although the model does not explicitly account for
age, we can alter β to change the ‘length’ of the second period. Increasing β (i.e. raising the
remaining lifetime), proportionately raises the value of a given endowment and investment.
Total expenditure on investment increases with the remaining time.
Proposition 2 Let β > β′, and let I∗ be a solution to the problem with discount factor β
and I∗′ be a solution to the problem with discount factor β′. Then C(I∗) > C(I∗′).
Therefore, younger workers spend more on investment, as is intuitive and as in the
Ben-Porath model. However, this result only addresses total investment costs. It does not
necessarily mean that investment in any particular individual skill will decrease with age.
Combining propositions 1 and 2 suggests an intuitively appealing explanation for why
older workers are less likely to shift occupations in response to a skill shock. They both
invest less overall in additional skills due to a (shortened) horizon effect and are more heavily
invested in an existing stock of skills, the inertia effect. Therefore, their stock of skills after
investing more closely resembles their initial stock of skills, and they will tend to remain in
similar jobs. We address this point more fully in continuous time.
So far, all results carry over to the general two-period model in the online appendix. For
the model used here, we can do more: we find mild sufficient conditions for the optimal
investment and its cost to be discontinuous in β.
Proposition 3 If (ρ−1)(σ−1) < 1 and the productivity of skills is not identical, there is an
endowment such that investment cannot be continuous in β. That is, if (ρ−1)(σ−1) < 1 and
minnAn < maxnAn there is an endowment S such that, if I∗(·) maps each β into the set of
optimal investments for that β, then I∗ does not admit a continuous singlevalued selection.10
Informally, β captures the length of the second period relative to the first or, even more
informally, the worker’s age. When the worker is old, there is little investment and the
worker’s second-period job choice and first-period job choice are relatively similar. When
the worker is young, it makes sense to shift more towards jobs that are intensive in a highly
valued skill even if the worker was initially endowed with more of a low-value skill. The
shift between the two is discontinuous in β, and thus informally the worker’s age, when
(ρ−1)(σ−1) < 1, as this condition ensures that a varied portfolio is both expensive and not
that productive. We expand on this point in the discussion of the continuous-time model.
10A singlevalued selection from a correspondence F : X ⇒ Y is a function f : X → Y such that
f(x) = y =⇒ y ∈ F (x).
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3 Extensions of the Two-Period Model
3.1 Credit Constraints
With a single skill, we could fully replicate a Ben-Porath model by imposing the additional
constraint that investment be (weakly) less than production, which would only slightly com-
plicate the model. As in Ben-Porath, we could then have workers (for certain endowments)
fully specialize in investment in the first period. In this section we show that, with mul-
tiple skills, a credit constraint can work very differently than it does in the Ben-Porath
model. In particular, workers’ behavior may be influenced by credit constraints even when
the constraint does not bind with equality in equilibrium.
Recall that because a worker with more skill n chooses a job that is more intensive in n,
the skill value function, V, is weakly convex11 even though each individual job’s production
function is linear. Put differently, there can be (locally) increasing returns to investment in
a skill such that a large investment may be worthwhile even if a small investment is not.
This can make the investment problem non-convex, and therefore produce solutions affected
by the constraint, but without the constraint binding with equality. This corresponds to
our example in the introduction, where unconstrained workers choose to be plumbers, but
constrained workers choose to be painters, in which case they do not borrow up to their
borrowing limit. We derive sufficient conditions for this to be true.
If (ρ−1)(σ−1) < 1, workers are driven to specialize, but their specialization may depend
on their ability to invest. As a result, if (ρ−1)(σ−1) < 1 and skill productivity is sufficiently
varied, there is an endowment and a constraint such that the constraint affects the outcome,
but does not bind with equality.
Proposition 4 Assume (ρ− 1) (σ − 1) < 1. There exists an x > 0 such that if for some
n,m we have An · x < Am, then there exist S, c such that if I∗ solves the unconstrained
investment problem with endowment S and I∗c solves the investment problem with endowment
S and constraint c, then C (I∗) > c and C (I∗c ) < c.
The basic intuition can be seen in Figure 1 which shows, in an example, how the budget
constraint affects both total investment and the particular skills invested in. As the worker
is endowed with much skill 1, for low values of the constraint he simply continues investing
in that skill. It’s not worth investing in skill 1 for long, as its productivity is mediocre,
so investment is constant for an intermediate constraint. However, once the constraint is
greater than 1 the worker specializes heavily in skill 2, and the constraint once again binds
11With the convexity inequality strict for all but parallel skill vectors.
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Figure 1: Investment expenditure in skill 1 (solid line) and 2 (dotted line) as a function of
the budget constraint c when A1 = 1, A2 = 4, β = 1, δS1 = 2.75, S2 = 0, ρ = 2, σ ≈ 1.
until c = 4. Beyond that, further investment is inefficient, and relaxing the constraint further
has no effect on net output.
This result has a sensible explanation: even though production at any given job is concave
in investment expenditure, the ability to choose jobs may make a worker’s market production
non-concave in investment expenditure. Therefore, constraints on investment expenditure
can influence a worker’s career without binding with equality. Intuitively, a plumber who
would make a great doctor might not be able to afford the entirety of medical school. If
this worker spends her budget on the half year of schooling she can afford, she will still
effectively be a plumber with some medical skills; given that the return to medical skills is
low in plumbing, this investment is not worthwhile.
We note that, in principle, it is possible to test for the existence of the type of credit
constraint that our model highlights. In standard models, relaxing the budget constraint
(increasing c in terms of the model) should have no effect on borrowing for anyone not
borrowing up to the original credit limit. In standard models, if we present two samples
with different credit limits c1 < c2, the cumulative density functions of the amount borrowed
should, up to sampling error, be identical at levels of borrowing below c1. In our model,
some workers who would borrow strictly less than c1 when that is the constraint, borrow
more than c1 when the constraint is relaxed. Thus, our model predicts that the cdf of
borrowing under the higher constraint should merely first-order stochastically dominate the
cdf of borrowing under the lower constraint. Experiments using different constraints could
be conducted in a variety of settings to determine the importance of the phenomenon we
11
discuss in the introduction.
3.2 Mobility Costs and Overinvestment
Suppose now that the worker’s job choice problem is one of accepting an offer by a firm. If
a multitude of firms (at least one at each job) offer wages prior to each period under perfect
information about the worker’s skills, the usual solution holds. But if there is a mobility cost
m to be paid by the worker if she moves jobs between periods 1 and 2, things are different.
The period-1 or incumbent firm can retain the worker by offering her the highest wage offered
elsewhere, minus m, and will do so if this difference is less than the worker’s productivity at
the incumbent. The incumbent firm has local monopsony power. The monopsony rents will
be distributed back to the worker as part of the period-1 wage, but there is still inefficiency.
In such a situation, if the worker does not move between periods, her investment decision
is distorted. Instead of optimizing her net productivity at the job she actually will do,
she maximizes the highest outside wage offer she receives - her outside option - minus the
investment cost.12
This inefficiency can be ameliorated if firms have the ability to include training as part
of the first-period offer: an investment in the worker’s skills that the firm pays for. A first-
period offer is therefore a triple (J, IF , w) where J is the job, IF is the firm’s investment
and w is the wage. The worker will then be able to augment this investment to IW ≥ IF ,
paying the difference C(IW ) − C(IF ). The worker’s investment remains non-contractual:
only the firm will be bound by the first-period offer to invest in a particular way. It is
perhaps unsurprising that adding an additional dimension to offers improves efficiency, but
the way in which this is accomplished reveals much about firms’ incentives to manipulate
human capital formation.
Denote the worker’s investment best response function13 mapping the firm’s investment
commitment to total investment by IW (·), and by I∗(J) the efficient investment for job J .
Proposition 5 Assume (σ − 1)(ρ − 1) > 1. Suppose the worker with skill endowment
S >> 0 stays in job J in both periods, but would not absent the mobility cost. Then the
accepted first-period offer (J, IF , w) satisfies IW (IF ) >> I∗(J).
The intuition for this result is simple: to the worker, investments in different skills are
substitutes. The worker’s incentives are to overinvest in certain skills relative to the current
job’s weights in order to improve the outside option for bargaining purposes. Then, by
12This is akin to Konrad and Lommerud (2000) in which family members have an incentive to inefficiently
over-invest in market human capital prior to intra-family bargaining in order to improve their outside options.
13Sometimes this will be a correspondence; if (ρ− 1)(σ − 1) > 1, it is guaranteed to be a function.
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increasing investment in other skills - those not overinvested in - the firm can dampen the
worker’s incentives. The firm wants to commit to overinvest in these counterweight-skills.
The reason for this is that at the appropriate level of investment in some skill for the current
job, the direct effect of further investment in that skill on net production is only a second-
order loss; whereas the efficiency gain from disincentivizing the worker’s excessive investment
elsewhere is a first-order effect.
The condition that (ρ − 1)(σ − 1) > 1 is sufficient, but far from necessary. It is not
difficult to develop examples in which this condition is violated, but the result goes through.
The essential requirements for the result to hold are that the worker treats investments in
different skills as substitutes, and that the worker’s return to investment expenditure in any
skill is concave on a relevant set.
It is interesting to contrast our framework with the closely related ‘Full-Competition’
regime in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b). In their model, as in ours, the firm can commit
to a level of investment but cannot commit to a second-period wage. As a consequence, if,
for any of a variety of reasons, the worker cannot recoup the value of any investment, the
firm will commit to the investment. If, as in our model, there is no mobility, the firm will
commit to the optimal level of investment. Because Acemoglu and Pischke model a world
with only a homogeneous skill, outside opportunities that are never used in equilibrium do
not distort investment. Distortion occurs in our model because there are multiple skills.
This model has a surprising testable implication. Suppose we observe a worker employed
at a firm and offer free general training, and that this intervention takes place after the
worker has joined the firm and that the new investment is in excess of IW . If the worker
can decide on the type of training received, her incentive is to increase her productivity at
her best outside option. This increases the probability of mobility: if she would have moved
previously, she will continue to move, and if she would not have, the increased investment
may be sufficient to make moving optimal for her. In contrast, if the firm chooses the
character of the training, its incentive is to use the additional investment to increase the
worker’s productivity at the incumbent firm relative to the best outside option. This may
be sufficient to entice the worker to stay when she otherwise would not.
In a standard model with a single skill and no mobility, either party would use the
investment to maximize the worker’s productivity. In a Roy-style model with costly mobility,
although the worker’s choice of training could increase mobility, the firm could at best under-
provide training to keep mobility constant; only in a multi-skilled model can the firm use
general training to decrease mobility.
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4 Continuous Time
To explore the dynamics of skill investment more fully, we port the model to continuous time.
Unlike the two-period model, the continuous-time model does not lend itself to analytic
results similar to the ones in previous sections.14 However, its rich dynamics will allow
us to simulate workers’ adjustment to technological changes in production in a far more
realistic way. Specifically, we will be able to investigate the effects of such shocks on the skill
investment, career, and earning paths of workers of different ages and skill endowments.
4.1 Setup
The problem is now defined over an interval in continuous time [0, T ], which is discounted
at a rate r. The worker possesses skills S(t) at time t; the productivity vector is A and the
worker chooses jobs J(t) from the job set J = {J ∈ RN+ |
∑
n J
σ
n ≤ 1} so that her time-t
instantaneous production is ΣnAnJn(t)Sn(t). Skills depreciate at rate ∆, counterbalanced
by investment I(t), so that
d
dt
S(t) = −∆S(t) + I(t). (12)
However, investment is costly, with time-t instantaneous cost C(I(t)) =
∑
n In(t)
ρ. En-
dowed with initial skills S0, the worker therefore seeks to maximize her lifetime utility by
solving
max
J :[0,T ]→J , I:[0,T ]→RN+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
ΣnAnJn(t)Sn(t)−
∑
n
In(t)
ρ
]
dt (13)
s.t.
d
dt
S(t) = −∆S(t) + I(t) (14)
S(0) = S0. (15)
The worker chooses I(t) and J(t) optimally. However, as J does not influence the state
variable, it is chosen according to (6). Thus, we can bypass job selection for the moment
and reduce the problem to
14Although we do not prove these results analytically, many insights from the two-period model extend to
this model. Since the convexity that drives the credit constraint result in the two-period model is present
in continuous time, it is straightforward to provide examples in which credit constraints are important even
though the worker does not borrow up to the constraint. Providing an example of overinvestment in the
continuous-time model would be more challenging, in part because we would have to take a stand on the
appropriate wage-setting mechanism in continuous time, which would take us far afield. Nevertheless, any
mobility cost will lengthen the time the worker spends at a particular job. If the firm has some bargaining
power, this creates the conditions for firm investment in the worker’s skills and overinvestment.
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max
I:[0,T ]→RN+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(∑
n
(AnSn(t))
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ
−
∑
n
In(t)
ρ
 dt (16)
s.t.
d
dt
S(t) = −∆S(t) + I(t) (17)
S(0) = S0. (18)
We therefore construct the Hamiltonian
H = e−rt
(∑
n
(AnSn(t))
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ
−
∑
n
In(t)
ρ
+∑
n
µn(−∆Sn(t) + In(t)). (19)
The solution is given by the N, one for each skill n, equations
A
σ
σ−1
n (Sn(t))
1
σ−1(∑
n(AnSn(t))
σ
σ−1
) 1
σ
+ ρ(ρ− 1)In(t)ρ−2dIn(t)
dt
− (r + ∆)ρIn(t)ρ−1 = 0 (20)
along with the motion equations for skills
d
dt
S(t) = −∆S(t) + I(t), (21)
the initial condition S(0) = S0, and the transversality condition I(T ) = 0.
4.2 Ben-Porath Case
For some parameter values, a special case where all skills grow at the same rate obtains. In
such a case the solution to (20) becomes
In (t) =
(
Kn
1− e(r+∆)(t−T )
ρ (r + ∆)
) 1
ρ−1
(22)
where Kn is a constant. This leads to a constant ratio of investment in any two skills.
Figure 2 graphs an example of this ‘Ben-Porath case’. The worker enters the market
with twice as many units of skill 1 as of skill 2, and the optimal investment path maintains
that ratio. Net output (the wage) shows the classic hump-shaped pattern of the Ben-Porath
model and peaks later than gross output. Since investment reaches 0 at exactly time T , this
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Figure 2: The ‘Ben-Porath’ case of proportional skill evolution.
A1 = 2
.2, A2 = 1, ρ = 2, σ = 2.5, S0 = (40, 20) , ∆ = r = .05
is the point at which the two are equal.
4.3 Jobs and Skills Over the Lifecycle
It is generally not possible to obtain a closed form solution for (20). We can, however, solve
the system numerically for given values of A, ∆, r and S0. To demonstrate the potential
usefulness of this approach, we present two scenarios that we find particularly interesting.
First, we illustrate the case where the response to a shock is discontinuous. In this
scenario, the worker enters the labor market with 10 units of each skill. Initially skill 1 is
more valuable (A1 = 1.15 and A2 = 1.00). At some unanticipated point, the skill weights
reverse. We have chosen parameters such that the worker will tend to move towards jobs
that are intensive in their use of one skill.
Not surprisingly, when the worker is young, following the shock, she sharply shifts her
investment towards skill 2. However, if she has been in the labor market for more than a
few years, she has accumulated enough skill 1 that it is no longer beneficial for her to shift
towards jobs that use skill 2 more intensively. As a consequence of the shock, she invests
less heavily in skill 1 than she would have otherwise. She also invests somewhat more in
skill 2, but the effect is so small that it would not be visible in the figure. The discontinuity
arises from the horizon effect: as she ages the worker has less time in which to recoup her
investment, but more importantly in this case, from the inertia effect: her accumulated
investment in skill 1 makes it very costly to shift to a skill-2-intensive occupation.
Our second scenario features three skills which we refer to as Manual, Routine (Cognitive)
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Figure 3: Initial Investment by Experience at Time of Shock
ρ = 1.7, σ = 1.7, ∆ = r = .05
and Abstract. Our chief example considers a worker subject to an unanticipated shock that
increases the value of the Abstract skill while also decreasing the value of the Routine skill.
We consider an individual who arrives in the labor market with 25 units of each skill.
Initially the Routine skill is the most valuable (ARout = 1.2); the first lies in the middle
(AMan = 1.13) and the third skill is the least valuable (AAbs = .8) to the worker. The worker
is assumed to be in the labor force for forty years, discounts future income using an interest
rate of five percent which is also the rate at which each skill depreciates.
We consider an unanticipated shock that occurs in either the worker’s 10th, 20th or 30th
year in the market. The shock reduces ARout to .8 and increases AAbs to 1.25 while leaving
AMan at 1.13.
While we view this exercise as an example rather than as a serious calibration exercise,
we have chosen the parameters to be broadly consistent with reality. Quick conversations
with some of the leaders in the field confirmed that the magnitude of the shocks we assume
is broadly consistent with the post-1980s shock to the U.S. economy although, of necessity,
we model the shock as instantaneous.15 The remaining parameters were chosen to produce
a wage profile broadly consistent with typical ordinary least squares estimates of the experi-
ence/earnings profile. If we regress log earnings (ln(gross output - investment cost)) on time
and time squared measured in years, the coefficients are .100 and -.00162. This compares
15While it would be computationally messy, we could model the shock as a series of unexpected shocks
playing out over a longer period. However, a more serious treatment would have to address how expectations
formed following the initial shock, something that would take us far from the current model.
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with OLS estimates for 1980 in Heckman, Loechner and Todd (2006) of .1255 and -.0022 for
whites and .1075 and -.0016 for blacks. The OLS approximation to our data implies that
earnings peak at 31 years of experience with earnings growth of approximately 154 log points
at the peak. The Heckman, Loechner and Todd estimates imply a peak at about 29 years
for whites and about 34 years for blacks, and earnings growth of 179 and 181 log points at
the peaks. Using the simulated data rather than the quadratic approximation to those data,
earnings peak at about 34 years of experience and are about 183 log points higher at the
peak than initially.
Since in the example workers arrive in the market with similar amounts of the Routine
and Abstract skills, the shock represents a mild form of positive shock for the youngest
workers. However, given the initial technology, the worker will invest most heavily in the
Routine skill before the shock. Therefore the adjustment path of experienced workers reflects
both a seizure of new opportunities and a retrenchment from declining occupations.
Figure 4: Job’s Skill Weights by Experience at Time of Shock
Figure 4 shows the path of the worker’s job’s skill weights if she experiences no shock and
at 10, 20 or 30 years of experience. The top left corner shows the baseline with no shock.
Absent the shock, the worker specializes in the Routine skill.
We see that if the shock arrives when she has thirty years experience, she immediately
mechanically (since ARout falls) chooses a slightly less Routine-intensive job. Overall, she
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adjusts very little. She continues to work in Routine-heavy jobs as she has accumulated
a large stock of Routine skill even though the value of that stock has fallen by about a
third, although she also shifts somewhat towards more manual-intensive jobs. Much of the
increased weight on Abstract skill reflects the greatly increased value of that skill in all jobs
rather than a shift towards investment in Abstract skill.
A shock at twenty years of experience has a more noticeable effect on career (job) choices.
But because the worker’s stock of Abstract skill has depreciated so much over twenty years,
by the end of her career, she shifts towards Manual-heavy jobs. Again, much of the increased
weight on the Abstract skill is mechanical.
Only when the shock arrives sufficiently early in her career does she adjust by invest-
ing much more heavily in Abstract skill and somewhat more in Manual skill, so that she
eventually works in a job that places the greatest weight on Abstract skill.
Figure 5: Net Output and Experience by Timing of Shock
Figure 5 shows net output over time. As prior to the shock, the worker invested most
heavily in a skill whose value is reduced, the worker suffers an immediate adverse shock to
net output. The magnitude of the shock will depend largely on how much of the Routine skill
she has accumulated relative to the other skills. As a consequence, the individual shocked
at 10 years of experience suffers an earlier but smaller output shock. Compared to a similar
person suffering a shock at 20 years of experience, she has higher output at every later
experience level. The person shocked at 20 years of experience fares almost as badly in the
last 10 years of work as the person shocked at 30 years.
In this example the shock is in a sense positive; a worker who begins her career just as
the shock hits will earn 4.5 percent more over her lifetime than if she finished her career
before the shock hit. One who ends her career just as the shock hits will be unaffected. By
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continuity there will be a range of low experience levels at which the effect of the shock will
be positive. We expect, but have not shown, that the effect of the shock is U-shaped. The
significant point is that a positive shock can have a negative effect for a very long time. In
Figure 5, the individual shocked at 10 years of experience never returns to the net output
level that she would have reached in the absence of a shock.
If the workers in our example smooth consumption over their lifetimes, very young work-
ers will have accumulated less debt than somewhat older workers while workers nearing re-
tirement will have accumulated more retirement savings than those somewhat further from
retirement. Therefore, very young workers and those nearing retirement do not need to re-
duce the flow of consumption by as much as someone in between. We continue our example
by assuming that people live for another 20 years following retirement and smooth their
consumption perfectly except for the effect of the unanticipated shock. This implies that
debt peaks at around age 35 and that savings turn positive at around age 49.
Here we find that a worker shocked at 30 years of experience must reduce her consumption
by 22 percent relative to what she had anticipated. She had anticipated doing most of her
saving for her retirement during the last ten years of her working life and is therefore hit
sharply by the decline in her earning capacity over this period. Although both hold large
and similar quantities of debt, workers shocked at 20 and 10 years of experience must reduce
their consumption by 27 percent and 19 percent. Of course, the worker shocked at 10 years
suffers this consumption loss over a longer period.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the example is the length of time for which an
ultimately positive shock can be negative. This is because skill investment is extremely
front-loaded to allow for longer exploitation time, so the loss is great even when the shock
hits early. While ours is an example, not a calibration exercise, we find this duration and
magnitude of the effect striking.
4.4 Why older workers adjust less
Table 1: Different skill paths in response to shock
Skill levels when shocked Time Twenty years after shock
Manual Routine Abstract remaining Manual Routine Abstract
38.44 52.38 21.17 30 52.76 32.94 50.73
38.44 52.38 21.17 20 39.23 30.17 30.13
43.77 68.51 16.56 30 59.24 42.76 39.13
43.77 68.51 16.56 20 42.61 38.74 22.00
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We now wish to explore why workers vary in their adjustment. In Table 1, we present
four workers at the time the shock hits. Two have accumulated the level of skills that the
baseline worker in the example has accumulated after ten years (the first two rows of the
table), and two have the level of skills this worker accumulated after twenty years. Within
each pair, we consider the investment decisions of such a worker with thirty (rows one and
three) and twenty (rows two and four) work years remaining. The last three columns show
the stock of skills for each worker twenty years after the shock.
Comparing the first and fourth rows shows the difference, after twenty years, in the skills
of a worker shocked at ten and twenty years of experience. Relative to the latter, the former
has substantially more Manual skill and, especially, Abstract skill, and less Routine skill
despite the fact that the she had less Manual skill and only slightly more Abstract skill at
the time the shock hit. As a consequence of both her greater accumulation of Routine skill
and her shorter horizon, the worker shocked at twenty years ends up twenty years later with
more of the Routine skill and less of the other skills. How much of this difference can be
attributed to the fact that she has a shorter time horizon and how much to the fact that she
is heavily invested in the Routine skill at the time the shock hits?
Comparing rows one and two casts light on the horizon effect. The worker with the
shorter horizon ends up with about three-quarters as much of the Manual skill, a little more
than half as much of the Abstract skill, and only slightly less of the Routine skill. The
horizon effect causes less investment in all skills, but this effect is most noticeable for the
positively shocked (Abstract) skill and least noticeable for the negatively shocked (Routine)
skill.
By comparing rows one and three we can find the inertia effect. This effect generates
a substantial reduction in the growth of the stock of the Abstract skill. The change in
the final stock of the Manual skill is not greatly different from the difference in the initial
stocks. The stock of Routine skill ends up substantially higher when the shock comes later
but by noticeably less than the difference in the initial stocks. Note however, that due to
depreciation the initial 16.1 difference in the stocks of Routine skill would have fallen to 5.9
had they invested at the same rate. The difference of 9.8 in their stocks after twenty years
shows that the inertia effect actually leads the worker with a greater initial stock to invest
more over the next twenty years. What remains once we have accounted for the two effects
is the ‘interaction effect’, an adjustment when both the inertia and horizon effects apply at
once.
Table 2 shows the responses in terms of job choices for workers with different initial stocks
of skill and time remaining. Just prior to the shock, our worker who is shocked after ten
years in the labor market is in a job that puts the most weight on the Routine skill. Twenty
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Table 2: Job choice responses to shock
Job’s weights when shocked Time Twenty years after shock
Manual Routine Abstract remaining Manual Routine Abstract
.55 .80 .22 30 .66 .29 .70
.55 .80 .22 20 .70 .38 .60
.51 .85 .14 30 .75 .38 .55
.51 .85 .14 20 .76 .49 .43
years later her job puts the most weight on the Abstract skill, almost as much on the Manual
skill and far less on Routine skill. In contrast, just before our worker with twenty years of
experience suffers the shock, she is in an even more Routine-intensive job that puts almost
no weight on the Abstract skill. Twenty years later, her job puts the most weight on the
Manual skill, and roughly equal weights on the other two skills.
Again we can analyze this difference in terms of both the horizon and inertia effects. Both
effects are roughly in the same direction: a shift towards Manual tasks and a moderation of
the movement from Routine towards Abstract tasks. Strikingly for the Routine and Abstract
tasks the changes from the first to the fourth row are close to the sum of the inertia and
horizon effects. In contrast, the interaction of the two effects blunts the shift to the Manual
task.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We develop a model of the microfoundations of dynamic skill formation that provides both
qualitative and quantitative insights. Nonconvexities that arise naturally in the model can
create settings in which credit constraints affect behavior even though they do not bind with
equality. Additionally, we explain why firms may invest in general skills: to manipulate
worker investment incentives towards skills that the firm values and away from those that
improve her outside option. This analysis draws on the insight of Lazear (2009) whose work
is complementary to the story told here.
We extend the model to a tractable continuous-time setting. This allows us to investigate
why similar workers of different ages react to shocks very differently. We show that, due to
the front-loading of investment, large shocks, even if positive on net, can have long-lasting
adverse effects on even relatively young workers. Although only an example, this should
make us think very carefully about winners and losers and perhaps even the political economy
issues.
Since Ricardo, arguments for trade and technological innovation have relied on compen-
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sating transfers. Our model suggests that ‘losers’ may be difficult to detect because they
include not only those who continue using similar skills even though their value has de-
clined, but also some workers displaced to jobs that use skills that have increased in value.
Moreover, the importance of credit constraints for limiting transitions to better jobs may be
hidden because workers who do not appear to be credit constrained are unable to afford the
optimal set of new skills.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (I ′, J ′2), (I, J2) solve the corresponding problems. Then, from optimality,
βΣmJ2,mAm(δSm + Im)− C(I) + βΣmJ ′2,mAm(δS ′m + I ′m)− C(I ′) (23)
≥ βΣmJ2,mAm(δS ′m + Im)− C(I) + βΣmJ ′2,mAm(δSm + I ′m)− C(I ′) (24)
which, cancelling terms, implies
ΣmAm(J2,m − J ′2,m)(Sm − S ′m) ≥ 0.
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which, recalling that for m 6= n, Sm = S ′m, becomes
(J2,n − J ′2,n)(Sn − S ′n) ≥ 0.
Given that S ′n > Sn by assumption, we have J2,n ≤ J ′2,n. If J2,n = J ′2,n then it follows that
J ′2 must also solve the problem for endowment S, as incentives in dimensions other than n
are unchanged; but J ′2 cannot solve the problem for both S and S
′ as they produce FOCs
in dimension n that are different. Therefore J ′2,n > J2,n. From that we deduce I
′
n > In,
as investment in skill n for a given second-period job J∗2,n is I
∗
n = [AnJ
∗
2,nρ
−1]
1
ρ−1 , which is
increasing in J∗2,n.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose I∗ is a solution to the problem with discount β and I∗′ is one with β′. Then,
optimality implies
βV (δS + I∗)− C(I∗) ≥ βV (δS + I∗′)− C(I∗′) (25)
β′V (δS + I∗′)− C(I∗′) ≥ β′V (δS + I∗)− C(I∗) (26)
so that, after some manipulation
(C(I∗′)− C(I∗))(β′ − β) ≥ 0 (27)
C(I∗) ≥ C(I∗′) (28)
Now, supposing C(I∗) = C(I∗′) for contradiction, we have V (δS + I∗) = V (δS + I∗′) or else
one of the objective functions is improvable. Then, from the first order condition for I∗′ we
have β′∇V (δS + I∗′) = ∇C(I∗′) and thus β∇V (δS + I∗′) >> ∇C(I∗′). This means that I∗′
improves on the objective over I∗ in the β problem, so I∗ is not a maximizer. Hence, it must
be the case that C(I∗) > C(I∗′).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Fix ρ, σ such that (ρ − 1)(σ − 1) < 1. WLOG let A1 = minnAn; by assumption there’s an
n such that A1 < An. Let S = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0).
Let I∗ be a function such that for all β > 0, I∗(β) is an optimal investment. We claim
I∗ is not continuous.
First, we show that for high enough β, the worker does invest in skills other than 1. If
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the worker invests only in skill 1, she solves
max
I1
βA1[δ + I1]− Iρ1 (29)
for optimal investment
I1 =
[
βA1
ρ
] 1
ρ−1
(30)
so that the value of the worker’s problem is
βA1
[
δ +
(
A1β
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
]
−
[
βA1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
= βA1δ + A
ρ
ρ−1
1 (ρβ
ρ
ρ−1 − 1)ρ− 1ρ−1 (31)
whereas investing only in a skill n and choosing a job putting weight only on skill n similarly
yields a value of
A
ρ
ρ−1
n (ρβ
ρ
ρ−1 − 1)ρ− 1ρ−1 . (32)
Investment in only skill 1 would therefore not be optimal if the value from investing in only
skill n is higher; this is the case when
βA1δ + A
ρ
ρ−1
1 (ρβ
ρ
ρ−1 − 1)ρ− 1ρ−1 < A
ρ
ρ−1
n (ρβ
ρ
ρ−1 − 1)ρ− 1ρ−1 (33)
which is necessarily true for high enough β as ρ
ρ−1 > 1 and An > A1. Therefore, there exists
a β ≥ 0 and m 6= 1 such that I∗m(β) 6= 0. When β = 0, there is no future to invest in and
I∗(β) = 0.
Thus, if I∗ were continuous, a sequence βn → β¯ would exist with the property that
0 6= I∗m(βn) → 0. However, the derivative of the worker’s objective at positive Im with
respect to Im is
β
A
σ
σ−1
m I
1
σ−1
m(
Σk[Ak(δSk + Ik)]
σ
σ−1
) 1
σ
− ρIρ−1m (34)
which is less than
β
A
σ
σ−1
m I
1
σ−1
m
(A1δ)
1
σ−1
− ρIρ−1m (35)
but as (ρ− 1)(σ − 1) < 1, we have ρ− 1 < 1
σ−1 , so the second expression must be negative
for low enough positive Im. Therefore, the first-order condition for positive Im cannot be
satisfied as βn → β¯. Thus, I∗ cannot be continuous.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Take some x > 0 such that x
ρ
ρ−1 (1 − ρ
β(ρ−1)x
(σ−1)(ρ−1)−1
ρ−1 ) > 1. As (σ − 1)(ρ − 1) < 1, this is
possible. Then, assume an A such that there are n,m with An · x < Am; convene WLOG
that A1 = minlAl and A2 = maxlAl. Then we can find k > 1 such that
(
A2
A1
) ρ
ρ−1
(1 −
k ρ
β(ρ−1)
(
A2
A1
) (σ−1)(ρ−1)−1
ρ−1
) > 1. Set c =
(
βA1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
kρ and S =
((
A2
A1
)σ
c
1
ρ , 0, 0...
)
.
First, consider the constrained problem. Suppose that the constraint c binds. Consider
the problem of allocating c across the different skills; each i > 1 is allocated Ii and the
remainder goes to skill 1. If the constraint binds, the investment decision must
max Πbind = max
I−1
(
[A1(S1 + (c−
∑
i>1
Iρi )
1
ρ )]
σ
σ−1 +
∑
i>1
(AiIi)
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ
then (ignoring the outer power) the first order condition with respect to Ij is
∂Πbind
∂Ij
=
σ
σ − 1
(
A
σ
σ−1
j I
1
σ−1
j − A
σ
σ−1
1 [S1 + (c−
∑
i>1
Iρi )
1
ρ ]
1
σ−1 (c−
∑
i>1
Iρi )
1−ρ
ρ Iρ−1j
)
which is 0 for Ij = 0. For Ij > 0, recalling (ρ− 1)(σ − 1) < 1,
∂Πbind
∂Ij
=
σ
σ − 1I
1
σ−1
j
(
A
σ
σ−1
j − A
σ
σ−1
1 [S1 + (c−
∑
i>1
Iρi )
1
ρ ]
1
σ−1 (c−
∑
i>1
Iρi )
1−ρ
ρ I
(ρ−1)(σ−1)−1
σ−1
j
)
<
σ
σ − 1I
1
σ−1
j
(
A
σ
σ−1
j − A
σ
σ−1
1 S
1
σ−1
1 c
1−ρ
ρ c
(ρ−1)(σ−1)−1
ρ(σ−1)
)
=
σ
σ − 1I
1
σ−1
j
(
A
σ
σ−1
j − A
σ
σ−1
1 S
1
σ−1
1 c
−1
ρ(σ−1)
)
=
σ
σ − 1I
1
σ−1
j
(
A
σ
σ−1
j − A
σ
σ−1
2
)
≤ 0.
Therefore, if the budget constraint c is to bind, it must be that it is spent only on skill 1. If
the worker invests only in skill 1, she solves
max
I1
[
β
(
(A1(S1 + I1))
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ − Iρ1
]
so that I∗c,1 =
(
βA1
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
for an expenditure of
(
βA1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
< c. As a consequence of these
two points, the budget constraint c does not bind. To construct a lower bound for the
unconstrained worker’s payoff, we suppose the worker only invests in skill 2 and suppose the
job that only puts weight on skill 2 is chosen. This results in a payoff of βA2I
∗
2 − I∗ρ2 =
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(
βA2
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(ρ− 1). We want to show this is greater than the constrained payoff, that is,
(
βA2
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(ρ− 1) > A1S1 +
(
βA1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(ρ− 1)
which, after rearrangement and division by (βA1
ρ
)
ρ
ρ−1 (ρ− 1) becomes
(
A2
A1
) ρ
ρ−1
(
1− k ρ
β(ρ− 1)
(
A2
A1
) (σ−1)(ρ−1)−1
ρ−1
)
> 1
which we know to be true; therefore, the unconstrained problem yields strictly higher utility.
So, it must be the case that any solution to the unconstrained problem must violate the
constraint; thus, C(I∗) > c > C(I∗c ).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1: At least one skill is overinvested in.
If for all n we have IWn (I
F ) ≤ I∗n(J) then from the solution to the static problem we have
J∗(δS+ IW (IF )) ≤ J and therefore either the constraint job constraint holds without equal-
ity: ΣkJ
σ
k < 1 and thus a strictly more productive job exists (a contradiction to optimality);
or J is optimal in the second period in the absence of a mobility cost, which is not the case as
(i) ex hypothesi the worker would move absent the cost and (ii) we know that the solution to
the static job-choice problem is unique. Therefore there is an n for which IWn (I
F ) > I∗n(J).
There is at least one skill that is overinvested in.
Step 2: No skill is underinvested in.
Consider the worker’s problem after accepting an offer. Given IF , the worker chooses IW
to maximize her second period wage net of what she spends on investment:
max
IW
βV (δS + IW )−m− c(IW ) + c(IF ) s.t. IW ≥ IF (36)
which given the exogeneity of IF and m is the same problem as
max
IW
β(∑
n
(An(δSn + I
W
n ))
σ
σ−1
)σ−1
σ
−∑
n
IWρn s.t. I
W ≥ IF (37)
The first order condition for IWn (when the n’th constraint does not bind with equality and
thus IWn > I
F
n ) is
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βA
σ
σ−1
n (δSn + I
W
n )
1
σ−1
(∑
m
(Am(δSn + I
W
m ))
σ
σ−1
)−1
σ
− ρIW ρ−1n = 0 (38)
which can be rewritten as
βAσn
δSn + I
W
n
I
W (ρ−1)(σ−1)
n
= ρV (δS + IW ) (39)
As (ρ− 1)(σ− 1) > 1 by hypothesis, the left hand side is decreasing in IWn . Therefore IWn is
decreasing in V .
Now we will show that if some skill is invested in to a level less than what is efficient
at J , the initial contract could have been improved. If for some m such that IFm = I
W
m (I
F )
we had dV (δS+I
W )
dIFm
≤ 0 (that is, if there is a constraint binding with equality that affects V
negatively) then for any n such that IWn (I
F ) > IFn , we would have
dIWn (I
F )
dIFm
≥ 0 and thus as
V (δS+IW ) = (
∑
k(Ak(δSk +I
W
k ))
σ
σ−1 )
σ−1
σ , V would have to increase, a contradiction. Thus,
we have shown that if the constraint in dimension n does not bind and IWm (I
F ) = IFm then
dIWn (I
F )/dIFm < 0 (?) .
Ex ante, as firms act perfectly competitively, the accepted period-1 contract maximizes
the worker’s lifetime utility subject to non-negative profits. That is, (J, IF , w) must
max
J,IF ,w
[
w + βV (δS + IW )− c(IF (IW )) + c(IF )−m](40)
s.t.
∑
n
JnAn(Sn + β(δSn + I
W
n ))− β(V (δS + IW (IF ))−m)− w ≥ 0 (41)
so that IF in particular has to solve
max
IF
β
∑
n
JnAn(δSn + I
W
n (I
F ))−
∑
n
(IWn (I
F ))ρ (42)
Suppose there is an n for which IWn (I
F ) < I∗n(J), so that skill n is underinvested in.
Then, setting ∀m, IF ′m := max{IWm , I∗m(J)}, from ? we have that IW (IF ′) = IF ′. That is, as
IF ′ produces a strictly higher V than IW (IF ), then when the contract is (J, IF ′, w) the vector
of constraints IW (IF ′) ≥ IF ′ must bind with equality. Therefore, as IF ′ improves the objec-
tive (42), we have a contradiction. Therefore, no skill is underinvested in: IW (IF ) ≥ I∗(J).
Combining this with Step 1, we have IW (IF ) 	 I∗(J).
Step 3: Every skill is overinvested in.
Now suppose there is a skill that is not overinvested in: by Step 2 this means that
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∃n : IWn (IF ) = I∗n(J). In Step 1, we have established that there is a skill m that is overin-
vested in: IWm (I
F ) > I∗m(J). Two cases are of interest.
Case 1. Suppose the unconstrained first-order condition (39) holds for IWm . Then, con-
sider the firm investment I¯F = IW (IF ). We have IW (I¯F ) = IW (IW (IF )) = IW (IF ) so that
since IF is part of an optimal contract so is I¯F (albeit with a compensating period-1 wage).
We will consider increasing I¯Fn to effect an increase in V and through it will implement a
decrease in I¯Fm without affecting (I¯k)k 6∈{n,m}.
We define the auxiliary function IˆFm(Iˆ
F
n ) implicitly by the worker’s FOC in dimension n:
βAσm
δSm + Iˆ
F
m
Iˆ
F (ρ−1)(σ−1)
m
= ρV
(
(δSn + Iˆ
F
n ), (δSm + Iˆ
F
m), (δSk + I¯
F
k )k 6∈{n,m}
)
. (43)
That is, IˆFm(·) maps out, for each level of firm investment in skill n, the worker’s optimal
investment in skill m, when all other skill investment is held constant. This will allow us to
vary skill m by varying skill n without violating the worker’s optimal choice of skills.
As S >> 0, we have ∂V/∂IˆFn > 0 and ∂V/∂Iˆ
F
m > 0; furthermore, the left hand side of
(43) is decreasing in IˆFm as (ρ − 1)(σ − 1) > 1. Therefore, we have dIˆFm(IˆFn )/dIˆFn < 0. If all
skills other than n and m are held constant, when the firm forces an increase in skill n, the
worker decreases skill m.
Consider now perturbing the investment I¯F by increasing I¯Fn and lowering I¯
F
m along
IˆFm(·). As V
(
(δSn + Iˆ
F
n ), (δSm + Iˆ
F
m), (δSk + I¯
F
k )k 6∈{n,m}
)
≥ V (I¯F ) when IˆFn ≥ I¯Fn , we have
that IW (IˆFn , Iˆ
F
m(Iˆ
F
n ), (I¯k)k 6∈{n,m}) = (Iˆ
F
n , Iˆ
F
m(Iˆ
F
n ), (I¯k)k 6∈{n,m}).
Written solely in terms of IˆFn (and keeping constant skills other than n and m), the
objective function (42) is
βJnAn(δSn + Iˆ
F
n ) + βJmAm(δSm + Iˆ
F
m(Iˆ
F
n )) + β
∑
k 6∈{n,m}
JkAk(δSk + I¯
F
k )
−C((IˆFn , IˆFm(IˆFn ), (I¯k)k 6∈{n,m}))
and is ex hypothesi maximized at IˆFn = I¯
F
n . Taking a right derivative of the objective with
respect to IˆFn we get
βAnJn + βAmJm
dIˆFm(Iˆ
F
n )
dIˆFn
− ρIˆFρ−1n −
dIˆFm(Iˆ
F
n )
dIˆFn
ρ(IˆFm(Iˆ
F
n ))
ρ−1 (44)
= (βAnJn − ρI¯Fρ−1n ) +
dIˆFm(Iˆ
F
n )
dIˆFn
(βAmJm − ρ(IˆFm(I¯Fn ))ρ−1) (45)
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But by assumption I¯Fn = I
∗
n(J), so that βAnJn − ρI¯Fρ−1n = 0 and IˆFm(I¯Fn ) = I¯Fm > I∗m(J) so
that βAmJm− ρIˆFm(I¯Fn )ρ−1 < 0. Furthermore, we have that dIˆ
F
m(Iˆ
F
n )
dIˆFn
< 0. Therefore evaluated
at I¯Fn , the restricted objective function’s right derivative is positive. As a result, there exists
a IˆFn > I¯
F
n so that (Iˆ
F
n , Iˆ
F
m(Iˆ
F
n ), (I¯k)k 6∈{n,m}) improves the objective function (42) over the
assumed maximizer IF , a contradiction.
Case 2. Now suppose instead that the unconstrained first order condition (39) does not
hold for any overinvested-in skill m. Consider again I¯F = IW (IF ), which is again optimal
under the hypothesis that IF is. For some overinvested-in skill m define IˆFm(Iˆ
F
n ) implicitly
by
V
(
(δSn + Iˆ
F
n ), (δSm + Iˆ
F
m), (δSk + I¯
F
k )k 6∈{n,m}
)
= V (δS+ I¯F ) when IˆFn ≥ I¯Fn is small enough
for a solution to exist. In other words, IˆFm adjusts to Iˆ
F
n so as to keep production at the
optimal outside option job constant (even as the optimal outside job may change).
Then as V is constant along (IˆFn , I
F
m(Iˆ
F
n )) for Iˆ
F
n ≥ I¯Fn , skills k 6∈ {n,m} stay constant.
As V has strictly positive (as S >> 0) and continuous partials, dIˆFm(Iˆ
F
n )/dIˆ
F
n > 0; the rest
of the argument follows as in Case 1.
B A Little Empirical Evidence
We examine workers who were in routine-cognitive intensive jobs in 1968 and in 1982 and
examine their use of such skills fourteen years later. The IBM PC was introduced in mid-
1981. A typist in 1968 was likely to be using an IBM Selectric typewriter although she
(most probably) might have used a less sophisticated electric typewriter or even a manual
typewriter. By 1982, it is very likely that she would have used an IBM Selectric although
occasionally she might have moved on to an early wordprocessing system. In either case,
her work would not have changed dramatically. And the job of the young typist in 1982
would not look that different from her counterpart in 1968. By 1996, the spread of the
personal computer had dramatically reduced the role of typists. A similar story can be told
for bookkeeping and other jobs that were routine-cognitive intensive.
To look at how employment of such workers changed, we use the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. We select the principal respondent and spouse, if any, who were employed and
present in the sample either in both 1968 and 1982 or both 1982 and 1996 and who were
age 20-49 at the beginning of the relevant period. We use the skill measures and crosswalk
for 1970 occupations from Autor and Dorn (2013). We define a job as routine-cognitive
intensive if it was in the top quartile of the use of routine-cognitive skills in 1982. The top
quartile is measured by the distribution of routine-cognitive tasks in the unweighted sample.
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We further require that their use of each of manual and abstract skills be below the average
for the unweighted sample in 1982. Finally, we limit the sample to workers who were in
such jobs at the beginning of the period (1968 or 1982). This left us with a sample of 162
individuals in 1968 and 219 in 1982 who were in the types of jobs that would be expected
to be heavily affected by the technological revolution between 1982 and 1996.
For each sample, we then regressed the use of routine-cognitive skills in the later period
(1982 or 1996) on age. The results are presented in table A.1. Comparing the two columns,
from the constant terms we see that, relative to the earlier period, workers in the later
period who started the period in routine-cognitive intensive jobs engaged in less routine-
cognitive intensive work fourteen years later. Although for both periods, the slope coefficient
is positive, indicating that older workers engaged in more routine-cognitive intensive work,
the coefficient is only statistically significant in the later period. The point estimates suggest
that workers who were less than 46 years old in 1982 reduced their use of routine-cognitive
skills in 1996 relative to what similar workers in 1968 had done by 1982. The difference is
statistically significant at the .05 level for each age in the 20-31 range.
Thus, as intuition and our model suggest, this small amount of evidence indicates that
younger workers adjust more to shocks than do older workers. At the same time, we should
not exaggerate this finding. The results for the two periods differ only at the .1 level, and
the difference between the two slope coefficients does not reach significance at conventional
levels.
Table A.1
Subsequent Routine-Cognitive Task Intensity Among
Workers Initially in Routine-Cognitive Intensive Jobs
1968-1982 1982-1996
Age 0.0276 0.0656**
(0.0249) (0.0260)
Constant 4.828*** 3.092***
(0.816) (0.797)
Observations 162 219
R-squared 0.008 0.029
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
PSID, Intensity measured 14 years later for individuals
in routine-cognitive intensive jobs in 1968 or 1982
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